Introduction 1
It is 1561, the Republic of Genoa judicially concludes a dramatic series of events that happened about fourteen years before. Filippo Casoni 3 , a century later, describes the year 1547 as grieved by atrocissimi accidenti: citizens' plots, princes' conspiracies, subjects' disloyalties, changes in the law, councils' conflicts and private nuisances and rivalries ruled; fear and danger reigned and liberties were at stake. One event especially marks that year: the plot of the Fieschi 4 .
dissatisfied by this course of political events gather around Gian Luigi Fieschi who is able to attract, to his cause, not only the anti-government Genoese faction, but also certain foreign powers, France and the Papal States, which aspire to 'rescue' Genoa from Spanish control and subdue it to their own. In January 1547, such a composite group, led by Gian Luigi Fieschi, tries to overthrow the government of Andrea Doria. The uprising is unsuccessful and the repression is unmerciful: the body of Gian Luigi Fieschi, who fell into the sea while crossing a gangplank between two galleys and drowned, is fished out of the water and put on public view in the dockyard, the Fieschi town residence and their castle in Montoggio are razed to the ground. In 1548 the last of the Fieschi family, Scipione, together with his brother-in-law, Giulio Cybo, again tries to overthrow the government of Andrea Doria. The revolt is stifled from the very outset, Cybo is captured and killed, while Scipione manages to flee over the border.
4
In Genoa an inquisitorial proceeding is started in Scipione's absence with the charge of lese-majesty 7 against the emperor, the Genoese government being faithful to the Spanish crown. The trial, started in March 1550, is entrusted to a judge delegated by the emperor Charles V, a certain Gomez Suarez Figueroa who is the Spanish ambassador to Genoa. The intervention of the emperor Charles V in the judicial proceeding -intervention required and strongly demanded by Andrea Doria -contextualises the conflict in a different environment. From struggle between two rival factions for the domination of the Genoese Republic, it becomes crime of lese-majesty against the emperor to whom Genoa is faithful. The trial ends in 1552 with a verdict of guilty. Scipione cannot go back to his homeland otherwise the death sentence will be executed, he is deprived of all his rights, fiefs and privileges. The dismemberment of the vast feudal possessions of the Fieschi family is completed and Scipione takes residence at the French court.
5
The peace treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, signed in 1559 between France and Spain, mentions Scipione Fieschi and entitles him to claim his feudal estates against those who own them at the time 8 . Ferdinand I, who succeeds Charles V in 1558, pardons Scipione and re-invests him with his former fiefs. In 1562, Scipione starts a legal action against the Genoese Republic at the imperial court of Prague, declares to have been badly judged, proclaims his innocence for the crime of lese-majesty and raises thirty-three exceptions of voidness against the judgment which has already passed in rem judicatam, with the purpose of having the sentence declared null and void.
6
The Genoese Republic submits the petition and the exceptions of voidness to the most eminent jurists of the time for examination, among them there are Ioannis Nervius, Ioannis Cephalus, Tiberius Decianus, Jacobus Menochius and the College of jurisconsults of Padua 9 . The jurists' responsa, given between 1571 and 1572, substantially agree in dismantling the defensive castle built by Scipione Fieschi's lawyers and invite the judges to reject the petition and the exceptions of voidness raised by Scipione. political and social dynamics which underlie the legal discipline of res judicata and null and void judgment in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries.
9
Once the phase of the open conflict has ended, it is by means of the judicial proceeding that things are settled. Scipione's extreme attempt at having the judgment declared null and void can be read as a sort of opinion poll. Scipione puts out feelers in order to evaluate his possibilities of going back to his homeland. 10 The choice of the judges, in 1574, to keep the res judicata firm is not only a judicial choice, it is above all a political choice and is a clear answer for Scipione. A complex balance between judicial and political reasons characterises every trial. The rules that govern the procedure have a certain margin for interpretation and often produce results in tune with the orientation of the political establishment.
11 In the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, the process of publicization of criminal justice strengthens the authority of the res judicata 12 which becomes a ruling instrument and a tool with which parties' capacity to settle a dispute is taken away.
12 Starting from the definition of res judicata as the irrevocable end of a correctly constructed judicial proceeding we will investigate that which, in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, gives substance to it.
We will see what the differences are between final judgment and res judicata and the relationship between appeal and res judicata. Then we will examine the elements which constitute the authority of the res judicata and the iuris et de iure presumption which gives it foundation. Finally, we will investigate the errors that can make the judgment null and void and, therefore, produce the rescission of the res judicata.
The story of such subtraction concerns the history of European criminal justice for a period of about three hundred years and is linked to the steady passing from a form of socalled "negotiated" criminal justice (based on settlements between offender and victim), to a form of criminal justice properly named "hegemonic", that is, coming ex officio 14 from a public judicial apparatus 15 .
16 "Hegemony" is a well known category in social history and was first highlighted by Gramsci in his Quaderni dal carcere. It indicates a model of power and «encapsulates the notion that the power of a ruling class [is] exercised less by coercion than by its intellectual and moral capacity to win the consent of the mass of the population. … Especially important for Gramsci [is] the transition in early modern Europe from an aristocratic society, where the political class [is] kept aloof by an effective caste system, to a capitalist society, in which a bourgeois state actively [seeks] to mobilise society as a whole in support of its aims and projects» 16 . Sbriccoli, a fine expert in Gramsci's work, uses the category of hegemony in order to describe the phenomenon of publicization of criminal justice in the early modern period and frames it within the legal and judicial system. 17 At the beginning of the Fourteenth century a strong character of publicization is impressed onto the criminal justice system. Town governments become aware that criminal justice is a decisive ruling instrument and therefore it cannot be left to the sole initiative of the victims. Judges prosecute crimes and convict the offender, even if the victim, having been negotially satisfied, has reconciled with him and has no more interest in the judicial proceeding 17 . In the Sixteenth century, between the offence and the satisfaction of the injured parties, between the crime and the re-establishment of public order, the res judicata interposes. This is regulated by principles included in the Corpus Iuris Civilis 18 and in the compilations of canon law 19 , but especially by doctrinaire works which flowered all around them. The value given to the res judicata is a possible indicator of the degree reached by the process of criminal justice publicization. 20 As for the definition of res judicata, not only have criminal law jurists been used but also jurists that are concerned with civil law, in that, throughout the Sixteenth and part of the Seventeenth century, criminal law borrows civil law categories to construct its own institutions 20 . 21 When jurists define res judicata, they distinguish it from the final judgment 21 . By final judgment, they mean a decision of the judge that defines and concludes the main subject of the case and that, therefore, necessarily contains words of acquittal or conviction 22 . Yet, the res judicata presents something more, an added value, if compared with the final judgment pronounced by the judge: the judgment passes in rem judicatam 23 following ten days, during which time, making an appeal is permitted 24 . The ten days given to the parties to appeal, are provided for by a principle of ius commune and represent a necessary break between trial and judgment, on the one hand, and the res judicata, on the other. A pause that allows the parties to evaluate the work done by the judge and its results, as well as to identify possible reasons for appealing. The appeal, as far as ius . However, article 1 of the CCC establishes the quaerela (which might be rendered as 'claim' or 'petition') to the emperor as a remedy in the case of unskilfulness, negligence or bribery of the judge, and more generally speaking, in all cases concerning denial of justice. Against unjust judgment, only the restitutio in integrum remains. Charles V urges caution to all his judges, especially to those of the lower courts, who have to transfer the judicial acts, in all dubious cases, to the colleges of jurisconsults of the great German faculties of law or to the higher courts (article 219 of the CCC) 31 . 24 Locally throughout Germany, different customs concerning the right of appeal survive.
There are areas where appeal of criminal decisions is allowed. Brunnemann 32 states that in the Brandenburg courts, appeal is permitted also in inquisitorial trials and Berlich 33 sustains the same for the courts of Saxony. However the rules concerning the appeal within the German regional principalities represent a more complicated problem than what could be envisaged at the outset, and if we examine, in greater detail, Saxony for example, we find out that the landscape is much more varied. Theodoricus 34 , while talking of the courts of Saxony, explains that the dichotomy between what is established in imperial constitutions and what is locally practised is due to the fact that the laws of the empire, above all, apply to the Reichskammergericht, and they cannot, and must not, be extended to the lower courts. He then goes on to specify that such a general, imperial norm, which does not allow for appeal in criminal cases, is linked to the inquisitorial trial in which the judge proceeds ex officio against the criminal, and which aims, mainly, at obtaining a confession from the defendant. He then concludes that, in those cases where an 'ordinary' -meaning 'accusatory' -trial is instead brought against a criminal, such imperial norm must not be observed, because the denial of appeal outside the Reichskammergericht is considered an extremely severe rule. 25 Carpzov, an eminent Saxon criminalist, seems to have a similar position: he affirms the right to appeal in criminal accusatory trials and denies it in criminal inquisitory trials. However, unlike Theodoricus, he is aware of the growing diffusion of the criminal inquisitory model also in the lower courts 35 and he is really concerned about the professional and personal qualities of the judges that sit in Saxon criminal courts. He describes them as cruel and easily seduced by money, to which features he adds the inexcusable lack of knowledge of criminal law and constitutions for the judges of the lower courts
36
. Therefore, Carpzov considers the transmission of the judicial acts to the colleges of jurisconsults of the great German faculties of law or to the higher courts provided for by article 219 CCC, a necessary part of the inquisitorial trial 37 . According to the jurist, even when the judge is honest and expert the transmission of acts is indispensable, because it cannot be accepted that criminal cases which deal with men's goods, fama and life undergo only one degree of adjudication 38 . For the same reasons expressed above, Carpzov holds that in the criminal inquisitory trial the defence of the Res judicata and null and void judgment in the Italian and German doctrine of...
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 12, n°1 | 0000 inquisitus has to be admitted, if indeed he cannot appeal against a conviction, he should be able to prove his innocence and the execution of the sentence has to be suspended 39 . 26 The rule that forbids appeal is widespread in the Courts of the Italian States, but it is often criticised and in certain areas is not followed or is substituted by other remedies. The appeal, according to Clarus
40
, concerns the right of defence that is part of the rights that naturally belong to each man and that, therefore, cannot be taken away from him by laws and statutes. However, the situation with which the jurist does his sums is quite different, and as he himself admits, in the Duchy of Milan, the laws in force at the time do not allow for making an appeal against criminal decisions. In the Princedom of Piedmont and Savoy, Menochius affirms that, even though making an appeal in criminal cases is not permitted, however re-hearing of the trial is allowed 41 . Farinacius refers that in his everyday experience in Rome Papal courts, appeal is forbidden in criminal cases only when they deal with certain atrocious crimes, and solely if those crimes are fully proved, or if the defendant has been caught in flagrant delict or has given a full confession. In the other cases the appeal must be provided for, because the atrocity of the crime is not a sufficient reason for its removal 42 . Baiardus in his Additiones to Clarus' Pratica criminalis, states that, as far as he could observe, it is forbidden to make an appeal against a sentence for murder in the Kingdom of Naples, however in practice the rule is not followed, instead ius commune is applied which permits the right of appeal 43 . 27 The appearance of rules that forbid appeal in criminal cases, has definitely something to do with the progressive expansion of the inquisitorial model in the judicial courts throughout Germany and Italy and meets strong criticism and resistance to its application. The elimination of the right of appeal indeed satisfies criminal policies which intend to put the problem of the causes' length right 44 , but at the same time it sacrifies one of the guarantees that are provided for the convicted 45 . 28 Moreover, the morphology of the res judicata is modified by the lack of providing for appeal in criminal decisions. It is no longer necessary that the time for appeal has clapsed as far as the passing in rem judicatam of the judgment is concerned. Final judgment and res judicata almost end up coinciding. The execution of the criminal sentence, usually delayed at the time of passing in rem judicatam, may be started immediately, following its rendition. Certain authors of criminal practices, aware of the dangers that may derive from that, provide for a series of cases which, should they come about, lead to respite of the execution
46
. Among these, for example, there is that of the judgment which sentences to a more serious punishment than the one usually imposed, in such a case the execution may be respited for 30 days 47 .
The authority of the res judicata 29 In the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, the res judicata is conceived as a rule and therefore presents normative and executive characters.
30
The res judicata, as can be read in the Tractati and in the Practicae of ius commune jurists, is a particular rule in that it concerns only the parties and has legal force between them 48 . The parties, therefore, have to conform to it and will bear all effects deriving from it. The res judicata can produce effects towards third parties only in certain, well determined cases 49 . . The final judgment of the magistrate, indeed, defines the case, but cannot be immediately executed. The res judicata plays an important role in the architecture of criminal justice that is maintained in a cohered state and may release all of its power thanks to the executive power which derives from it. 39 The jurists are extraordinarily eloquent when describing the effects produced on real life by the authority of the res judicata. A very impressive description states that the res judicata makes white become black, and black, white; it makes the undue, due; the nonheir, heir; it changes truth into falsehood and falsehood into truth. It makes abuse, right. It is source of law and, therefore, it can make the foreigner a citizen and the Guelph a Ghibelline, whether it damages or favours the party. Showing great clearness, however, jurists admit that these changes do not concern the essence of the matter, rather, they are important as far as the effects caused by the res judicata are concerned 69 . The res judicata is indeed unable to change the substance of goods and relationships, it can, however, reconstruct and feign a different one and make effects leap to the fore from such a reconstruction. 42 The presumption, which links the res judicata to the truth, creates a virtuous circle in which every single judgment is a reassertion of the legitimacy, validity and effectiveness of the whole juridical system. Every single judgment which comes to life, which passes in rem judicatam, and which produces its effects, bears witness that the juridical order, which generated it, is lawful, valid and effective. Every res judicata which is presumed true and which reaches the real truth of facts, on the one hand, confirms the good quality of the procedural law followed by the judge and its good application: the procedural law becomes the instrument which makes the judge able to reach the truth. On the other hand, it confirms the good quality of the substantial law applied by the judge and its capacity to produce justice.
Res iudicata pro veritate accipitur
43 The inextricable bond between justice and truth represents the challenging knot in every inquisitorial proceeding.
44 «Veritas est mater iustitiae» (Truth is the mother of justice) says Baldus 77 at the end of the Fourteenth century, and these words become a communis opinio still shared and followed in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, as its presence in the Summaries of law doctrine 78 bears testimony. Justice is generated by truth, therefore there is a strong mother-child relationship between them. Justice can only derive from truth and only in truth is there justice.
45 In every trial each party has its own truth to assess in order to reach its own particular justice. This statement challenges the inquisitorial system which is based on the axiom that there is only one truth. Within this system, judges -who represent the highest social institution: the res publica, and dispense public justice -assume the attainment of the truth as final goal of their judging activity. Good judges, being super partes, can and should reach the truth. «In iudicando judex debet semper habere veritatem prae oculis» (When judging the judge must always have the truth in front of his eyes), «Sine veritate bona non potest iustitia ministrari» (Without truth good justice cannot be provided for), «Iudex ad aliud positus non est, nisi ut veritate tueatur» (The judge is established only in order to defend truth), «Iudex debet omnibus modis laborare, ut veritatem quaerat et inveniat» (The judge must work in every way, in order to look for and find the truth) 79 are only some of the communes opiniones related to judges and their duty of achieving truth. 46 The first and most evident occurrence, deriving from this way of judging, is the possible splitting of the truth itself into two entities that will endlessly try to unify again: the truth spoken by the judge in the final judgment and maintained firm by the res judicata, and the truth of the facts, of what really happened. Indeed to tighten up the inquisitorial judging system, the res judicata -as final result of this system -must be given a value of truth. «Etiam veritas inducta a lege, prout est res iudicata quae vere et cum effectu pro veritate habetur, attendenda est et praevalet» (Also the truth induced by law, as it is the res judicata, which truly and effectively is considered as truth, must be obeyed and prevails)
80
. There is, therefore, a truth induced / produced by law, in that it is the law which establishes that the res judicata has to be maintained as truth. This statement necessarily implies that of the same fact there can be two truths: the truth reconstructed during the trial and deriving from the res judicata and the truth which we could call the truth of the facts or historical truth. Between these two truths there can be a dichotomy which is well known by the jurists, but is denied by the propaganda of the inquisitorial system. The inquisition tends to reach the truth of the facts
. However between the fact
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Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 12, n°1 | 0000 and the final decision there is a cognitive emptiness that the judge has to fill by means of various methods of inquiry: the same body of the accused can become an instrument which, if properly played, could lead the judge to the truth. Nevertheless in the process of collecting and evaluating evidence, a mistake, an error, an inaccuracy, a misinterpretation could occur and the inquiring path could forever diverge from the path leading to the truth. 47 In 1628 using a beautiful image Harpprecht 82 describes the work of the judge comparing it to that of architects and geometricians. They, using the plumb line, restore harmony, symmetry and proportion between unequal spaces as the judge restores harmony, proportion and equilibrium -where they have been compromised -with an exact judgment. The Latin word exactus, as past participle of the verb exigo, carries within itself the concept of rigorousness in measuring, weighing, pondering, evaluating hints, circumstances, suppositions, presumptions, proof. Moreover the word exactus finds its most appropriate use in the field of mathematics and geometry. Theories, which require the application of a rational method to jurisprudence and which are comprehensively developed few years later, are coming to light. In 1637, two years before Harpprecht's death, in France Descartes publishes his Discours de la méthode in which he affirms that the mathematical and geometrical method has to be generalised and applied to all human disciplines in order to reach the truth. In 1667 in Germany, Leibniz publishes his Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae: a work of great importance since in it there is an extensive application of the logical mathematical method to law. The German philosopher distinguishes between veritas rationis and veritas facti. The application of the logical mathematical method consents the veritas facti to identify itself with the veritas rationis at infinity.
Null and void judgment 48 Essential condition for realising the equation between truthfulness and res judicata is that the judgment has been pronounced rite et recte. The work of the judge acquires a remarkable importance. In order that the presumption comes into existence, it is necessary that he diligently carried out his officium. It becomes, therefore, indispensable to look at the product of the activity of the judge, the judicial decision, because this is what gives substance to the res judicata. Around it, problematical knots are tied which refer to its legitimacy and validity and which can make the res judicata waver. 49 The authority of the res judicata can cease because of the voidness of judgment.
50 The judgment bases its legitimacy and validity on: jurisdictio, jus, justitia.
In the second half of the Sixteenth century Gaill declares that the competent judge is essential part, basis and foundation of the judgment and the res judicata cannot come from somebody who lacks the potestas of ius dicere
83
. Around the first half of the Seventeenth century, Brunnemann summarises: «Iurisdictio fundamentum est omnis sententiae» (Jurisdiction is the foundation of every judgment) 84 , using a word -iurisdictio -which even if it has assumed a slightly different connotation throughout the centuries, strongly keeps its medieval value and still expresses the power of the judge of ius dicere by Res judicata and null and void judgment in the Italian and German doctrine of...
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 12, n°1 | 0000 means of the judgment 85 . The iurisdictio gives legal strength to the judgment, therefore the judgment has validity in that it is pronounced by a judge who has the potestas of ius dicere. Such potestas comes directly from the prince and in an uninterrupted chain transmits itself to the ordinary magistrates of the higher and lower courts and to the delegate judges. The judgment pronounced by a magistrate who lacks iurisdictio, has therefore no foundation and is affected by voidness 86 .
52 Among the most common exceptions of voidness pertaining to the lack of jurisdiction, there are those which concern the defect or vices of the delegation of the judge. For example, delegated judges have to present the rescript of delegation 87 to the court, to which they are appointed, within one year of its granting. Their jurisdiction starts and can be exercised legittimally only after the presentation of the rescript
88
. Regarding the case of Scipione Fieschi, this is the first exception of voidness which he raises against the res judicata that condemns him. Charles V grants Gomez Suarez Figueroa an imperial rescript of delegation the 11th of August 1548, but Figueroa presents it to the Genoese court only the 14th of March 1550. Not having been presented within one year, the rescript is null. Therefore he cannot exercise any jurisdiction over the case, and the res judicata is null and void 89 .
b) Jus
53 The judge manages the whole procedural course: from crime information to pronouncement of judgment, and therefore the correct application of procedural practices is entirely in his hands. In order to get a juridically valid judgment it is necessary that the parties have been regularly summoned, the evidence has been correctly secured, the decision corresponds to the criminal charge, is written and read to the parties on a weekday and contains clear words of acquittal or conviction 90 . If procedural norms are not fulfilled, the judgment lacks its substance, therefore, it is deprived of legal efficacy and is null and void. Scipione's lawyers complain of: the absence of defamation and accuser; an invalid citatio(which might be roughly rendered as 'writ of summons'); an invalid court appearance of Doria's lawyer, Hieronymus de Villa; and many other procedural vices.
54 According to ius commune in order to start an inquisitory trial against somebody, the investigated crime should be attributed to the inquisitus by public rumour, in short he should have mala fama. Since it is lacking, an inquisition could and should not be initiated against Scipione, therefore the judgment is null and void
91
. Moreover the lack of an accuser would not even consent the start of an accusatory trial, so according to Scipione's lawyers no judicial proceeding could be initiated at all against their client 92 . In order to have the judgment declared null and void, they are using rules of the ius commune which are still formally present in the law system and can still be used to support the party's own thesis, but which in practice are overcome by the ex officio judicial proceeding. 55 Scipione not being present, should be summoned three time before proceeding in his absence. Therefore, because he has not been regularly summoned, the judgment is null and void
93
.
56 Hieronymus de Villa does not exhibit his mandate to the court, therefore he could not stand for the Doria family and all his acts are null and void
94
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. They verify the correctness of the proceeding and formulate their opinion. The judge is bound to scrupulously respect it, because it must be considered in the same way as law and must be followed 96 . This modus operandi enables rectifying formal vices of the proceeding and complies with principles of trial economy: the judgment given without following the judicial procedure is indeed null and void. In Germany again, Leyser refers that errors in respecting the criminal procedure can drive the judge to define the case with interlocutory judgment instead of final judgment in order to avoid its voidness 97 . 58 The judge has to pronounce judgment in accordance with that which is established by customs, laws, statutes and constitutions of the place, otherwise the judgment is affected by voidness
98
. It is an opinion shared by ius commune jurists that the prudent judge should refrain from stating the reasons for the decision, so as to protect the res judicata from voidness of judgment: another little trick of procedural economy. Having not expressed reasons, it is more difficult to single out voidness of judgment that is linked to erroneous application of laws and statutes 99 . In the first half of the Seventeenth century however, certain jurists from the German area, who are sensitive to the right of defence and because of exemplariness, ask for the reasons to be stated in the decision 100 . 59 The communis opinio of the jurists is equated to laws and statutes, when it is confirmed by laws. In this case as well, the judgment, that opposes it, is null and void
101
60 It is not easy being a judge in the Seventeenth century. The German jurists are aware of the fact that multiplicity of laws and the manifold variety of communes opiniones represent a great difficulty for the judges, especially for those of the lower courts, who -not always being experts of law -have trouble in finding the right law to apply to cases. Jurists therefore create a doctrinal principle which justifies the judge and lets go unpunished he who judged badly due to error, unskilfulness or negligence
102
. Harpprecht goes so far as to say that in such cases the judgment is not void, but appealable, therefore passes in rem judicatam and is not amendable any more, if the interested party does not present appeal within the ten days established for this purpose 103 .
c) Justitia
61 The judge must attain the substantial truthfulness of facts, in order to realise justice among the parties.
62 This idea of justice tightly clinging to truth which can be reached through the rightful work and judgment of the judge, has some of its roots in canonistic science 104 and feeds the really lively doctrinal debate on the judge's rightness of judging according to conscience or according to judicial evidence 105 . Jurists ask themselves how the judge has to behave whenever he knows the truth: for example in the case in which he knows that the accused is innocent while the evidence gathered during the proceeding leads to his conviction. The solution, that some of the jurists single out, is that in such a case the judge has to transfer the case to a higher court or to the prince 106 .
63 Judges, otherwise, must abide by the judicial acts and the evidence gathered during the trial. Jurists are worried by the fact that to let magistrates judge according to conscience could mean letting them act in the most indiscriminate and arbitrary of ways
. Jurists
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64 This picture acquires a greater complexity if we assume a different viewpoint and take the arbitrium iudicis 110 , a regulated discretionary power of the judge, into consideration. If during the trial, the judge has not reached full proof (two eyewitnesses or confession, according to ius commune) of the fact, but he has gathered sufficient circumstantial evidence against the accused, he can sentence him to a poena extraordinaria, an extraordinary punishment 111 . In this case as well, the truth spoken by the final judgment and kept firm by the res judicata could hypothetically not correspond to the truth of the facts.
65 This truth reduced, subject to mistakes is the product of public justice. This is the truth that men are made to accept and that is kept firm with the res judicata eliminating the right of appeal.
66 Indeed, as Scaccia correctly says, the defects of the judicial decisions which are related to justice give the parties the right to appeal, while those which are related to the proceeding give the parties the right to present a quaerela nullitatis 112 . Once the right of appeal is eliminated, the parties have lost a fundamental guarantee of theirs, that which consents the losing party to intervene in order to correct the non-conformity of the judgment with the truth of the fact.
67 For Sixteenth-and Seventeenth-century jurists the elimination of the right of appeal in criminal cases determines the problem of the unjust judgment. Some jurists believe that if the unjustice is manifest, it produces such an error in the judicial decision that it can be considered like those that render the judgment null and void. Others more rigorously declare that the unjustice of the judicial decision does not pertain to the substance of the proceeding and therefore cannot render the judgment null and void 113 . If new evidence, which could not be found during the trial for just cause, arises the unjustly convicted party can claim the restitutio in integrum 114 . In Germany the prohibition of the appeal in criminal cases determines an increase of the petitions for mercy to the Sovereign. The petitions and the mercy that often follows alter the correlation between what is established in the final judgment and what is executed 115 .
68 It is common place among jurists that judges -in order to judge well -must have two different types of salt in their brain: the salt of science and the salt of conscience. If the first one is lacking, they are insipid and therefore not able to perform their duties, because they are not supported by the knowledge of law. If the second one is missing, they are diabolic, in that judges who do not conform their judgments to truth and justice are ministers of the devil 116 .
Remedies 69
The judge rules the proceedings and therefore the delivery of a correct judgment, on which the formation of a valid res judicata depends, is entirely in his hands. The powers of the judge and the errors that he can make are two directly proportional quantities. The greater the powers entrusted to the judge, the greater the number of errors he can make
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117 . Great importance is therefore assumed by the remedies that the judicial system puts at the disposal of the party which suffers an invalid or unjust judgment.
70 Even though Sixteenth-and Seventeenth-century jurists know the distinction between error in law and error in fact of the judgment 118 , it is not upon this basis that they build the theory of the voidness of judgment. As we saw, the voidness of judgment derives instead from the fact that the error is expressed, manifest 119 . The voidness can be asserted notwithstanding the passing in rem judicatam and for a period of thirty years 120 .
71 The remedy given against a null and void judgment, that passed in rem judicatam, is elaborated by late ius commune and consists of the quaerela nullitatis
121
. If the quaerela nullitatis is allowed, it determines the rescission of the decision 122 . A considerable number of jurists suggests that it is not right to execute the res judicata affected by manifest voidness 123 . Together with them, there are those who affirm that the execution of the res judicata cannot be delayed by the excuse of its manifest voidness, because the presumption of truthfulness lies with the judgment 124 . It is perhaps not by chance that these words come from Gaill, assistant judge at the Reichskammergericht in the second half of the Sixteenth century and who recounts well the practices followed by this supreme court.
Conclusion 72
The power of judging and the duty to do it according to certain rules concentrate on the figure of the judge. The res judicata produces effects exactly because it is the result of the correct interaction between such power and such duty. The power of judging that the political order entrusts to the judge is limited by the fact that he has carried it out within the rules established by the same political order. The widening and narrowing of these limits have repercussions on the irrevocability -or better on the capacity of not being rescindable -of the res judicata which, in the most extreme hypothesis, could be valid and therefore produce its effects even in the case where the judge operates without respecting the rules
125
. 73 The res judicata is progressively constructed as an instrument whose purpose is to defend and keep the judging activity of the judge sound and to assess its legitimacy and validity against other forms of pacification which intervened between the parties. The res judicata is presented as the definitive remedy for solving conflicts. Even if private settlements still exist, they are gradually deprived of authority by the growing importance of the judge's decision, of which they are not any more a valid alternative. This great power entrusted to the judge must necessarily be regulated, and judges have to be careful in wielding it, in that they deal with questions concerning the innocence and guilt of a person. As Brunnemann says, the firmitas of the res judicata (meaning its irrevocability) cannot be extended to the point of harming the body and the fama of an innocent person, since the law did not give the judge the power to condemn or make an innocent person infamous
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ABSTRACTS
In this article the author investigates the errors that can make the judgment null and void and, therefore, produce the reversal of the res judicata.
She -starting from the definition of res judicata as the irrevocable end of a correctly constructed judicial proceeding -tries to find out what, in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, gives substance to it in order to better understand the discipline of the miscarriage of justice of the time. She will, therefore, see the differences between final judgment and res judicata; the relationship between appeal and res judicata; the elements which constitute the authority of the res judicata; the iuris et de iure presumption: res iudicata pro veritate habetur which gives it foundation; and the judicial errors made in a criminal judgment that are taken into consideration by the Italian and German ius commune jurists.
Dans cet article l'auteure étudie les erreurs qui peuvent rendre le jugement nul, et en conséquence, produire la rescision de la chose jugée.
À partir de la définition de la chose jugée comme la fin irrévocable d'un procès criminel correctement construit, elle tente de découvrir ce qui, aux XVI e et XVII e siècles, lui donne substance afin de mieux comprendre la discipline de l'erreur judiciaire du temps. Elle verra, donc, les différences entre le jugement final et la chose jugée; le rapport entre l'appel et la chose jugée; les éléments qui constituent l'autorité de la chose jugée; la présomption iuris et de iure: res iudicata pro veritate habetur qui constitue sa base; et les erreurs judiciaires commises dans un jugement criminel qui sont prises en compte par les juristes italiens et allemands de ius commune.
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